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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In this action, Plaintiff seeks payment from Defendant, 
a partial owner of an oil well location, for the value of 
labor and materials furnished at the oil well location pursuant 
to a contract between Plaintiff and the corporate operator 
of the well, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was decided by the District Court on stipulated 
facts. From a Judgment for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment and entry of 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The existence of an express contract with a third 
party precludes the finding of an implied contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his legal remedies 
precludes his recovery from Defendant on the equitable theory 
of quantum meruit. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding 
of liability under quantum meruit because Plaintiff has failed 
to show that Defendant was unjustly enriched. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was submitted to the District Court on facts 
which were stipulated to by Plaintiff and Defendant. In 
lieu of a record on appeal, the parties have again stipulated 
to the facts and have submitted an Agreed Statement of the 
Record on Appeal, which has been approved by the District 
Court. 
Plaintiff Stan Knight conducts an insulation business 
under the name and style of Stanco Insulation Services. (R. 1.) 
Defendant George P. Postf doing business as Post Petroleum 
Company, owned a 33.75% working interest in an oil well location 
in Uintah County, Utah; the balance of the working interest 
was owned by others. (R. 1, 2) Post Petroleum Companyf 
Inc. (not a party to this action) was the corporate operator 
of said oil well. 
Mr. Knight contracted with Post Petroleum Company, Inc., 
the corporate operator, to furnish labor and materials for 
References to stipulated facts are to the pertinent para-
graph of the Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, designated 
by an "R" (i.e., R. 1, R. 5, etc.); references to exhibits 
are to the exhibits attached to the Agreed Statement of the 
Record on Appeal, designated "Ex." (i.e. Ex. "A", Ex. MDn, 
etc.) and also to the Addendum designated "Add." (i.e. Add. "1," 
Add. "3," etc.) 
the insulation of an oil tank battery and erection of two 
buildings at the well location. (R. 4) Between March 18, 
1982 and April 26, 1982, Mr. Knight performed and completed 
the work he contracted to perform. (R. 5, Ex. "C," Add. "2") 
He then submitted his invoice (Ex. "B," Add. "1") to the 
corporation in the amount of $18,437.13, which the parties 
agree is the reasonable value of the materials and services 
furnished. (R. 5) Due to his relationship with the corporation, 
Mr. Post was aware that Mr. Knight was billing the corporation 
(R. 6), with which it had contracted (R. 4), and not Mr. Post 
or his proprietorship personally (R. 6), with whom Mr. Knight 
had not contracted. 
Mr. Knight's invoices were not paid and on July 14, 
1982, he recorded a Notice of Lien (R. 7, Ex. "C," Add. "2") 
in which he expressed his intent to hold and claim a lien 
on the interest of the corporate operator in the oil well 
location. (R. 7) Several months later, the corporation filed 
a petition in bankruptcy and, on January 10, 1983, Mr. Knight 
filed a c red i to r ' s claim against the corporation in the bankruptcy 
2 
proceeding, seeking payment of the entire amount due. (R. 8, 
Ex. "D," Add. "3") It was at this time, nearly nine months 
after the work was completed, that Mr. Knight first learned 
of Mr. Post's ownership interest in the well and elected 
to seek payment from him. (R. 9, 10, 12) Until that time, 
On February 6, 1984, Mr. Knight amended his bankruptcy 
claim to seek only those sums which he does not recover from 
Mr. Post in these proceedings. (R. 13, Ex. "F," Add. "4") 
Mr. Knight did not even know of Mr. Post's existence (R. 
10) and he had consistently sought payment only from the 
corporation with which he had contracted. (R. 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8; Ex. "B," "C," "D;" Add. "1," "2," "3") 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in its Ruling in favor of Plaintiff 
because Plaintiff is barred as a matter of law from recovery 
on quantum meruit. Plaintiff had no express agreement with 
Defendant and, therefore, he must rely on an implied contract 
based on unjust enrichment. Plaintiff is precluded however, 
from recovering on the basis of an implied contract because 
he had an express contract with a third party and because 
he has failed to exhaust his legal remedies. 
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has not lost his right 
to sue on an implied contract, the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain such an action. The stipulated facts show only 
that (1) Defendant's property was benefited by Plaintiff's 
work and (2) that Plaintiff has not been paid therefore. 
There is a third element of unjust enrichment, however, which 
is that it would be unjust for Defendant to retain the benefit. 
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof on this 
point as there is no evidence even on stipulated facts, that 
Defendant has been unjustly enriched. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW FROM RECOVERING 
ON QUANTUM MERUIT. 
A. There is No Express Agreement with Post. 
The stipulated facts clearly show that Mr. Knight never 
entered into an express agreement with Mr. Post for provision 
of the materials and labor which are the subject of this 
litigation. Mr. Knight admits that his contract was with 
Post Petroleum Company, Inc., the corporate operator of the 
well location. (R. 4) And, of course, he could not have 
contracted with Mr. Post personally since he did not even 
learn of Mr. Post's existence or his partial ownership interest 
in the well until long after the work was completed. (R. 10) 
Plaintiff's right to recover from Defendant "must be based 
upon an agreement, either express or implied." Commerical 
Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. vs. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 
(Utah, 1977). There being no express agreement with this 
Defendant, Plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the basis 
of an implied contract. 
B. The Existence of an Express Contract Precludes the Finding 
of an Implied Contract. 
As noted above, Mr. Knight admits that he had an express 
contract with the corporate operator, Post Petroleum Company, 
Inc. (R. 4) That very fact precludes him from from asserting 
that Mr. Post is liable to him under an implied contract. 
"There cannot be an express and an implied contract for the 
same thing existing at the same time." 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution 
and Implied Contracts, §6, p. 948, approved in Commercial 
Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. vs. Adams, supra, at 564 P.2d 
774. See also Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 
196 Pac. 225, 15 A.L.R. 641 (1921). 
The relationship of the parties in Commercial Fixtures, 
supra, was similar to the relationship of the parties here. 
There, the defendant's lessee, Great Outdoors, Inc., entered 
into a purchase contract for materials which were incorporated 
into the defendant lessor's building. When the lessee defaulted 
in payment of the purchase price, plaintiff brought suit 
directly against the lessor on an implied contract theory 
of unjust enrichment. This Court denied recovery to the 
plaintiff, saying: 
It is also noted that there was 
an express contract between plaintiff 
and the lessee for the furnishing of 
materials, and when an express agreement 
exists one may not be implied. 
564 P.2d 774. The same result should obtain here. Mr. Knight 
contracted with Post Petroleum Company, Inc. which, just 
as the tenant in Commerical Fixtures, was not the owner of 
the property. The existence of that express contract precludes 
a direct action against Mr. Post in this action. 
C. The Equitable Remedy of Quantum Meruit is Not Available 
to Plaintiff Because He Failed to Exhaust His Legal 
Remedies. 
Under the facts of this case, it is apparent that Mr. Knight 
had available to him several legal remedies. He has chosen 
to forego those remedies, however, preferring instead to 
initiate this direct action against Mr. Post. Unfortunately 
for Plaintiff, the law does not permit such an election. 
Once again the facts in Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, 
Inc. vs. Adams, supra, are similar to the instant facts and 
the law stated therein is determinative here. In Commercial 
Fixtures, this Court noted that the plaintiff had failed 
to file a lien and had failed to sue the lessee. Such failures 
constituted one of the grounds on which this Court denied 
plaintiff equitable relief: 
The action brought by plaintiff 
is one in equity and brought without 
any attempt to exhaust any legal remedies 
available. Also, the stipulated facts 
are that plaintiff has brought no suit 
against the lessee nor did he initiate 
any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, 
if any he had. As a consequence, such 
lien right was lost by passage of time. 
564 P.2d 774. The same defects and others lie here. Mr. Knight 
failed to record a valid lien, failed to initiate an action 
under the owner's bond statutes, and failed to pursue his 
claim in bankruptcy against the corporate operator. 
It is to be noted that Mr. Knight did attempt to impose 
a lien on the property but failed to properly describe the 
interest to which the lien was to attach. A review of the 
Notice of Lien (Ex. "C," Add. "2") shows that Mr. Knight 
was uncertain as to the interest held by Post Petroleum Companyf 
Inc. in the property. The lien notice states that he intended 
to hold and claim a lien "upon the property and improvements 
thereon owned and reputed to be owned by Post Petroleum Companyf 
Inc. as lessee or operator of the mineral rights. . . . " 
(Ex. "C," Add. "2" lines 3-6; emphasis supplied) Further, 
Mr. Knight stated in the second single spaced paragraph of 
the Notice that, "The undersigned furnished said materials 
to was [sic] employed by Post Petroleum Company, Inc., who 
was the operator, . . . ." (emphasis supplied) Thus it appears 
that Mr. Knight knew that Post Petroleum Company, Inc. was 
the operator of the well but apparently was uncertain as 
to whether or not it was a lessee thereof. In view of his 
uncertainty, Mr. Knight had a duty to inquire or to investigate 
the records of the Uintah County Recorder to determine the 
legal title owner. Having failed to do so he cannot be heard 
to complain that he liened the interest of the operator which, 
of course, was a fruitless act since the operator had no 
interest. 
Mr. Knight also had an opportunity to recover his debt 
under what is commonly known as the owner's bond statute, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) §§14-2-1, et seq. 
(Add. "6") Under that law, providers of labor and materials 
have a direct right of action against the sureties if a bond 
has been posted (§14-2-1) orf if no bond has been posted, 
a direct right of action against the owners. (§14-2-2) Such 
actions may be brought at any time within one year from the 
date last materials were furnished or labor performed. (§14-
2-2) Mr. Knight completed his contract on April 26, 1982 
(Ex. "C," Add. "2") f thus he had a right to sue until April 26, 
1983. Yet he failed to avail himself of that opportunity, 
even after he learned of Mr. Post's partial ownership when 
the bankruptcy proceeding was filed in January, 1983. 
Finally, Mr. Knight has failed to assert and prosecute 
his claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, electing instead 
to sue Mr. Post on implied contract. Mr. Knight did initially 
file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the entire 
amount due (R. 8, Ex. "D," Add. "3"), but has since amended 
that claim to seek only the difference between the amount 
due and what he recovers here. (R. 13, Ex. "F," Add. ,f4") 
Thus he has once again failed to pursue a legal remedy available 
to him. 
Courts of other jurisdictions have followed the same 
rule of law as that followed by this Court in Commerical 
Fixtures, supra. In Utschig vs. McClone, 114 N.W.2d 854 
(Wis. 1962), the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the subcon-
tractor fs lien statutes of Wisconsin offer security and protec-
tion to subcontractors and refused to allow direct action 
against the property owner, saying that the subcontractor's 
"failure to avail himself of the remedy so provided does 
not produce for him a right to recover payment directly from 
an owner who did not employ him with whom he had no contract." 
114 N.W.2d 856. And in Dale's Service Company/ Inc. vs. 
Jonesy 534 P.2d 1102 (Idaho, 1975), a case which is on "all 
fours" with the instant action, the Supreme Court of Idaho 
refused to allow a subcontractor's direct claim in quantum 
meruit against a land owner where it had not availed itself 
of its remedies under the mechanic's lien laws. 534 P.2d 
1107. See generally 62 A.L.R.3d 288, Subcontractor's Recovery 
Against Owner, §4, pp. 297-303, and cases cited therein, 
wherein the annotator observed at page 297 that denial of 
recovery by a subcontractor is: 
[G]enerally grounded . . . upon such 
factors as the insufficiency of the evidence 
to establish any unjust enrichment of 
the land owner at the subcontractor's 
loss or expense and the failure of the 
subcontractor to have availed himself 
of his other remedies. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROVING 
EACH ELEMENT NECESSARY TO A RECOVERY ON QUANTUM MERUIT. 
Even on stipulated facts, Plaintiff's evidence does 
not support a judgment against this Defendant on a theory 
of quantum meruit. Plaintiff apparently assumes that he 
is entitled to recover if he shows simply that he performed 
work which benefited Mr. Post's property and that he was 
not paid for that work. That is not enough. As was said 
by this Court in Commerical Fixtures and Furnishingsf Inc. 
vs. Adams, supra: 
The mere fact that a person benefits 
from a contract between two others does 
not make such third person liable in 
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or 
restitution. See 66 Am.Jur.2d 960. 
There must be some misleading act, request 
for services, or the like, to support 
such an action. Mere failure of performance 
by one of the contracting parties does 
not give rise to a right of restitution. 
564 P.2d 774. Mr. Knight has shown that the property of 
a third party, Mr. Post, was benefited by a contract between 
he and the corporate operator. As stated by the Commerical 
Fixtures Court, that is not enough. Mr. Knight has also 
shown that the corporate operator failed to perform its side 
of the contract by not paying Plaintiff. Again, as stated 
by the Commerical Fixtures Court, that is still not enough. 
And obviously Mr. Post did not request Mr. Knight's services 
since his existence was not even known until long after the 
work was completed. (R. 10) 
Mr. Knight's only claim is that the name of Mr. Post's 
proprietorship, Post Petroleum Company, is similar to the 
corporate operator's name, Post Petroleum Company, Inc. 
Under the facts of this case, we fail to see how that circum-
stance could have misled Mr. Knight and resulted in his loss 
of direct remedies otherwise available to him. He admits 
that he knew he was contracting with the corporation. (R. 4) 
His Notice of Lien indicates that he was uncertain as to 
whether the corporation had a leasehold interest in the property 
or was merely the operator thereof. (Ex. "C," Add. "2") 
Significantly, he does not claim that he was misled by some 
document or misrepresentation. Obviously, he erroneously 
assumed that the operator was the owner. But under such 
an assumption, the situation would have been no different 
had Mr. Post's proprietorship been named the XYZ Oil Company. 
The crux of every action in quantum meruit is that the 
defendant has been unjustly enriched. Pendleton vs. Sard, 
297 A. 2d 887, 62 A.L.R.3d 277 (Me. 1972). The basis of liabi-
lity is the benefit conferred upon the defendant and not 
the detriment incurred by plaintiff. First Investment Company 
vs. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah, 1980). Thus it is 
Plaintiff's burden to show unjust enrichment. However, Mr. 
Knight has wholly failed to adduce any evidence that Mr. 
Post has been unjustly enriched. He simply assumes that 
since the property was benefited, he is entitled to recover. 
But mere enrichment is not sufficient—it must be unjust 
enrichment. "Clearly every benefit conferred is not recompen-
sable and unjustly received." Kershaw vs. Tracy Collins 
Bank & Trust Company, 561 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah 1977). 
Unjust enrichment cannot be presumed. Mr. Post could 
have been enriched, but not unjustly. For instance, Mr. 
Post's payment of Post Petroleum Company, Inc. pursuant to 
his contract with it would make his acceptance of the benefits 
just, as opposed to unjust, since he then did not accept 
the benefit without payment therefore. See Crockett vs. 
Sampsony 439 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App., 1969); Rogers vs. 
Whitson, 228 Cal.Ap.2d 662, 39 Cal. Rptr. 849 (Cal. 1964). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover in quantum meruit on the facts of this case. 
Plaintiff's recovery is barred as a matter of law since he 
has no express contract with Defendant, he had an express 
contract with the corporate operator which precludes the 
finding of an implied contract, and he has failed to pursue 
his legal remedies. Further, the evidence fails to show 
that Defendant was unjustly enriched. The lower court's 
ruling should be reversed and judgment entered in Defendant's 
favor, no cause of action. /> 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this £v day of June, 1985. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
P\ Alan Fletctier 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Attachment 
Number 
Stanco Insulation Services Statement, 
dated 6/17/82 (Ex. "B") 1 
Notice of Lien (Ex. HCn) 2 
Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy (Ex. "D") 3 
Amended Proof of Claim [in Bankruptcy] 
(Ex. "F") 4 
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NOTICE OF LIEN 
The undersigned WILLIAM STANFORD KNIGHT, as owner of STANCO 
INSULATION SERVICE 
Hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a lien upon 
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be 
owned by POST PETROLEUM CO., INC., as lessee or operator of the 
mineral rights and located in Uintah County, Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
TOWNSHIP "1 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, U.S.B.&M. 
Section 9: The Roosevelt Unit -1-19 
• Q O 
/- ..V • ' 
The amount demanded hereby is §18,43/. 13 owing to the 'undersignpd for 
furnishing materials used in performing labor upon the construction 
improvement upon the above described property, to wi t,: ^ in'sula t ing 
afl oil well battery and erection of 2 buildings. '/ # *'C .^  
The undersigned furnished said materials to was employed by 
POST PETROLEUM CO., INC., who was the operator, such being done 
by the undersigned under a contract made between POST PETROLEUM CO. 
inc. and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which 
the undersigned did agree to Pay cash when the contract was performed, 
oar net within 30 days after completion in consideration of payment 
to the undersigned therefore as follows: 
Insulated battery built 2 buildings and furnished materials for 
the same . , 
and under wich contract the first material was furnished labor was 
performed on the 18th day of March, 1982 and the last was so 
furnished or performed on the 26th day of April; 1982, and for all 
of which materials labor the undersigned became entitled to 
$18,437.13, which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which pay-
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting 
to $ 0 leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $18,437.13 
after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which demand 
the undersigned holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provisions 
of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code annotated 1953. 
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.., S ta te of „ ~ - , and carrying on L J 
Street, In „„.......- , County of 
(City) 
IS A CORPORATION: 
t the undersigned Is the of , a corporation orr* 
1
 (O.^claJ tlUe) (Crrdltor) 
, County of _ -.. 
(Cily) 
al<e this proof of claim on Its behalf. 
... and carrying cm bu^ines* a t No _.„ Street 
- . . - Stale of ..
 t and i* duly 
(Creditor) 
B o x 3 4 0 . street, in F o p s e v e l t county o f U i n t a h 
( c , v ? i l l ] 
t ha t he Is duly authorized by raid . 
S e r v i c e 
fatah
 4^ 4 . , . , ,. . . v ^ W i l l i a m S t a n f o r d K n i g h t 
; ._ ? 
•of of claim In his behalf; tha t Baid proof cannot be made by *&JdV?il 1 i . d J J L . S . t . a n . f O x 3 . . . K n i a h . t . . 
he has requested his attorney to file on his behar±rUor) 
above-named bankrup t (or debtor) was a t and before the filing by (or against) him of the petition herein (for ad-
V.ruptcyO, and still la, Justly and truly indebted (or liable) to the claimant (or copartnership or corporation) in 
EI QHTEEN THOUS.^ (? ....1.?./..l?.^. 13 
consideration of this debt (or liability) is as follow*: 
tion work at well ^ b^ttery aj^ buildinas in _ 
T T.Sor_R Jl"w^ 
4. That no |par t of the debt (or liability) has been paid except _ -KP.D© _ 
re are no set-offs or counterclaims to the debt (or liability), except N O N E 
6. That claimant (or aaid copartnership or aaid corporation) does not hold, and has not, nor ha* any person by his or (JU) 
order, or to the knowledge or belief of the undersigned, for hi* (or Its) use, had or received, any security, or s-ecuritit* for the 
debt (or l iabil i t l) , except ' . . N O N E 
7. (If the debt or liability Is founded upon an Instrument of writing.) That the Instrument upon which the debt (or liability) 1* 
founded Is attached hereto (or lost or destroyed, a* set forth In the aSdavi t attached hereto.) 
8. I If the ttbl is founded upon an open ar-countj That the said debt wa* (or will become) due on hPJ£.ljL~2.§.j...ll93.2 
(or that the av^r^ge date ' thereof I* ; that no note, or other negotiable Instrument, ha* been received 
for Buch accojnti or hj\y par t threof (or tha t the aaJd debt I* evidenced by a note, or other negotiable Instrument, which Is attached 
hereto; and that] 
*. This claim 
D.ted at _.?<>2_s_ 
no Judgment ha* been rendered thereon, except 
_29.QNE 
{ U N S E C U R E D , 1 8ECURED I 
P R I O R I T T J 
a h 
CLAIM 
LDL . t l d i J u J j e ^ L - a U j ok 3ajSL 
Eigne* ^ S l 3 ^ 0 . J l A 5 - A -
15. 83 
cj: VL\M diis) 
EXHIBIT !D 
l-CNALXr FOE 1'Hr.^ E.VTINO FfiACDOLOiT CLAJ1C. — TU* »f ».l — r+ fk»s U.K4 *r l e p H M i a u t S»r »•! io»r» 11** f •• je±r* .r Utk 
— Till* II, C. 8. P^ l i a . J 
(\Vhen signed mall this proof of claim to Referee In Bankruptcy) 
..'$1 
iL&'lUiTiQ 
OIL FIELD 
SERVICES 
•§£„ 
r 
L 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 64066 j Jf^S^, 
— u ? 
P.O. BOX 340 
I
PHONE 722-3J>47 
$ - ' ™ _ 
^ > f 
/ v l - V X - W 
STATE: \ ': . K( 
l-<fDS-X72-0L«9-1 
4* 
:TX IOOO ...i-: • BI*T% 
15 NO. P,CBI:':SJ:; 
j CKLLHOKACITY, ::CJGl0r.A 7313? 
' • f . - ' v " - . - ' ' 
_J & r.l?.Q^.78 
DATE REFERENCE CHARGES CREDITS BALANCE 
/ ':i./r-
,', '- r /f'n 
HJYOICES #215^, 
2155,2156 
urvcics $$*• 
INTEREST C::* A~CC 
6102.25 
11,750.00 
;:??s 60 DAYS ATO ol 
' 91.53 
jlKIS: STATEMENT 5 
3rou;iH-ERac3 ON 
3 TO K2P1AC2 STAT3 
6 /15 /82 .^" 
..--..:• thank you J 
HE«T SENT TO 
6102.25 
17,652.25 
17,?V\73 
CURRENT 30-60 DAYS 60-90 DAYS.: 1 *> DAYS A OVER SERV. CHG. TOTAL DUE 
; i i ; 7 5 W - *"• 6102.25'^-£ 91.53 ;$17t9^3.7? 
T ^Jhank Hjou PAY LAST AMOUNT IN THIS COLUMN 
^ I 
..r-.ir.. 2 :.„-) c/ CM./. 
IK THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
JL;\ K L : 
POST PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., 
Debtor. 
No. BK-82-01S89-B 
(Chapter 11) 
AMENDED PROOF OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW William Stanford Knight, dba Stanco Insulation 
Services and hereby and herewith amends his Proof of Claim hereto-
fore filed for the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-
SEVEN AND 13/100 DOLLARS ($18,437.13) and hereby serves notice 
• pon the Debtor in possession; Creditor's Coirimittee and/or Trustee, 
f appointed, that further facts have developed indicating that 
ost Petroleum Company, Inc., may not have an interest in the 
il well and properties in Uintah County, State of Utah, and 
ccordingly litigation has been commenced against George P. Post, 
Da Post Petroleum Company, a proprietorship, for collection of 
lis matter. 
This Proof of Claim is hereby amended and will be credited 
th any amounts recovered in the civil action pending in Uintah 
unty, State of Utah, wherein George P. Post, dba Post Petroleum 
mpany, is Defendant, Civil No. 12480. 
The effect of this amendment is to make the Proof of Claim 
sed upon a debt which may have a contingent liability determinatior 
D O C K S ' 
the Debtor in possession and/or Trustee is hereby given notice 
of this status and the claim is hereby amended in accordance 
herewith. 
DATED this , C ' day of February, 1984. 
William Stanford Knight, 'dba J 
Stanco Insulation Services / 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
William Stanford Knight, dba Stanco Insulation Services, 
being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states: That 
he has read the above and foregoing Amended Proof of Claim, with 
the contents therein, that the same is true and correct, except 
as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as 
to such matters he believes the same to be true. 
,}M . //-jJ) ^ o 
wi: 
St; 
•7 ty- A € 
'/- day of 
.Hi am Stanford Knight, dba S 
:anco Insulation 'Services ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
February, 1984. 
/,'?/t /,r /t Y/7'//?///*) ' 
Notary Pub l ic 
Residing i n Verna l , Utah 84078 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
v; ••••(' . " r / v x s r 
- 2 -
Knight, dba Stanco Insulation 
Services 
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-1201 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STAN KNIGHT dba STANCO INSULATION 
SERVICES, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
GEORGE P. POST dba POST 
PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
DEFENDANT. 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. 12,480 
The issue in this case is whether a contract can be implied 
between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the Theory of Quantum 
Meruit. The Elements of Quantum Meruit are generally that one 
party bestows a benefit upon another and retention of that bene-
fit without compensation would be unjust. The effect of finding 
these elements is the implication of a contract between the 
parties requiring payment for the benefit. The problem in this 
case arises when the work is performed at the request of one 
party but a third party is charged with receiving the benefit. 
In such a case, normally the third party cannot be held to be 
liable. However, two factors must be considered. First, was the 
third party to be the ultimate beneficiary of the benefit? In 
this case, the Defendant, being the owner of the well, was to be 
the ultimate beneficiary of the benefit and for that purpose 
obtained the services of the corporation to do the work. The 
EXHIBIT & 
corporation subsequently entered into an agreement with 
Plaintiff, the benefit of such flowing to the Defendant. While 
Plaintiff may have been acting under a mistaken impression of 
fact, the Defendant and the corporation were not. The Defendant 
was the owner desiring the benefit, the well drilled and put into 
production, and the corporation was hired to do so. 
Second, the relationship of the parties must be examined. 
Certainly, some relationship between Defendant and the corpor-
ation existed at the time of Plaintiff's services. The fact that 
Plaintiff may have been confused and billed the wrong party 
likely was known or should have been known to Defendant and the 
corporation. Such confusion cannot now be raised to shield the 
Defendant from responsibility when such confusion may have been 
contributed to by Defendant's action or inaction. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover from 
Defendant for the value of his services and materials received by 
defendant. 
The Court has not been shown the relationship of Defendant 
to the other owners of the well. It has been stipulated that 
Defendant is only a partial owner. Consequently, judgment is 
granted against Defendant in the sum of 33.75% of the amount 
claimed by Plaintiff, such judgment being $6,222.53, together 
with Court costs. 
DATED thi is J j day of February, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
<M^^Lh^ 
cc: John R. Anderson 
F. Alan Fletcher 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
Title 14, Chapter 2: Private Contracts 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. The owner of any inter-
est in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, 
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon 
land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond 
in a sum equal to the contract price, writh good and sufficient sureties, conditioned 
for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material fur-
nished and labor performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner 
and to all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has 
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure 
or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall have a direct right 
of action against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the mate-
rials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices 
agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days after the completion, 
or abandonment, or default in the performance, of the work provided for in the 
contract. 
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon 
request. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond—Direct liability—Limitation of actions, 
—Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to 
obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as heroin 
required, shall be personalty liable to all persons who have furnished ma-
terials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in 
any case the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability KIJJIII 
be commenced within one year from the last date the last materials weve 
furnished or the labor performed. 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen—At-
torney's fee.—In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this 
chapter the successful par ty shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) copies of the foregoing 
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John R. Anderson 
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